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Abstrat
Emerging ountries tend to default when their eonomi onditions worsen. If bad times in
an emerging ountry orrespond to bad times for the US investor, then these foreign sovereign
bonds are partiularly risky and should oer high returns. We explore how this mehanism plays
out in the data and in a general equilibrium model of optimal borrowing and default. Empirially,
we obtain a ross-setion of sovereign bond returns: the higher the orrelation between past
bond returns and US orporate default risk, the higher the average bond returns. A model of
risk-averse lenders with external habit preferenes an repliate this feature.
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In this paper, we study sovereign bonds issued by emerging ountries in US dollars. The Eu-
ler equation for an Amerian investor implies that sovereign bond pries depend on their default
probabilities and on ovarianes between bond payos and the investor's marginal utility of wealth.
Default probabilities are a well-known driver of emerging bond yields. The worse the Standard &
Poor's redit rating, for example, the higher the yield on average. In this paper, we show both theo-
retially and empirially that ovarianes between bond returns and risk fators are key determinants
of bond pries and debt quantities.
To illustrate the intuition behind this result, assume that an Amerian investor has onstant
relative risk-aversion and invests in one-period foreign government bonds. Emerging ountries tend
to default in 'bad times', when foreign onsumption is low. If bad times in the foreign eonomy
orrespond to bad times in the domesti eonomy, then foreign ountries tend to default in bad
times for the US investor. In this ase, sovereign bonds are partiularly risky, and the US investor
expets to be ompensated for that risk through a high return. Alternatively, if bad times in the
foreign eonomy orrespond to good times for the US investor, then sovereign bonds are less risky
and may even hedge domesti onsumption. As a result, sovereign bond pries depend on both
expeted default probabilities and the timing of default.
With this prie mehanism in mind, we turn to the data on sovereign debt. We look at bonds
issued by emerging market ountries that are inluded in JP Morgan's EMBI Global index. Yields
on EMBI bonds inrease with the probability of default as measured by Standard and Poor's redit
ratings. However, for a given default probability, there is signiant ross-setional variation in yields;
at the end of August 2008, for example, spreads were up to 300 basis points. To disentangle the two
prie mehanisms, we build portfolios of sovereign bonds by sorting ountries along two dimensions:
their default probabilities and their ovariane with US eonomi onditions. For the rst dimension,
we use Standard and Poor's redit ratings to measure the probability of sovereign default. Credit
ratings are not investor-spei and do not aount for the timing of a potential default. For the
seond dimension, we ompute bond betas, whih are dened as the slope oeÆients in regressions
of one-month sovereign bond returns on one-month US orporate bond returns at daily frequeny.
In our framework, US orporate bond returns proxy for domesti eonomi onditions and oer
a high frequeny measurement of investor marginal utility of wealth. This is onsistent with the
literature on orporate bond indies: Krainer (2004) shows that US orporate redit spreads are
ounter-ylial; Elton, Gruber, Agrawal, and Mann (2001) nd that a quarter of orporate bond
spreads are due to expeted default probabilities, and that the remaining portion ompensates for
o-movement with Fama and Frenh (1993) risk fators. After sorting ountries along these two
dimensions, we obtain six portfolios and a large ross-setion of holding period exess returns. The
average spread between ountries with low and high default probabilities is about 600 basis points.
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The average spread between ountries with low and high bond betas is about 300 basis points.
We study this ross-setion of exess returns from the perspetive of a US investor. We nd that
a large fration of the ross-setion of EMBI exess returns an be explained by their ovarianes
with just two risk fators: average EMBI exess returns and returns from a strategy that goes
long on the last portfolio and short on the rst. The rst risk fator represents the average return
for an investor holding bonds issued by all EMBI ountries. The seond risk fator represents the
exess returns from a zero-ost strategy that goes long on the orner portfolio with the highest
sovereign default risk and the highest exposure to US orporate default risk, and short on the orner
portfolio with the smallest sovereign default risk and the lowest exposure to US orporate default
risk. Portfolios with higher exposure to the seond risk fator are riskier and have higher average
exess returns beause they oer lower returns when US orporate default risks are higher.
To interpret our ndings and unover their impliations in terms of optimal borrowing, we
use a general equilibrium model of sovereign lending and default. We start from Arellano (2008)
and extend her model to N sovereign borrowers. In our model, a set of small open eonomies
borrow from a large developed ountry (the US). We onsider endowment eonomies. The only
soure of heterogeneity aross small open eonomies is their orrelation with the US business
yle. We introdue a key modiation to Arellano (2008): we assume that investors are risk-
averse and have external habit preferenes as in Campbell and Cohrane (1999). This feature
helps our understanding of the data: without it, eg when investors are risk-neutral, there is no role
for ovarianes in sovereign bond pries. In the model, ountries default after reeiving a series of
negative shoks. When business yles in emerging ountries and in the US are positively orrelated,
defaults tend to our when US onsumption is low relative to the habit level. Bonds issued by these
ountries are riskier and have lower pries beause they have low payos when the lender's marginal
utility of onsumption is high. As Arellano (2008) shows, the model mathes important features
of the emerging markets business yle. Consumption is more volatile than output; interest rate
spreads and trade balanes are strongly ounter-ylial. We thus fous on the model's impliations
for bond priing, and we reprodue on simulated data the experiment also run on atual data.
Using simulated data, we form portfolios by sorting ountries, again, along two dimensions:
probability of default and orrelation with the US business yle. In our simulations, exess returns
inrease along the two sorting variables. We fous here on the orner portfolios. First, ountries
with high default probabilities pay on average up to 130 points more than low default probability
ountries. This spread haraterizes low beta ountries. For high beta ountries, the spread due to
default probability almost double to attain 250 basis points. These spreads are large and signiant,
but somewhat lower than in the data. Seond, high beta ountries pay on average higher yields
than low beta ountries. The dierene in yields is only 20 basis points if the default probability
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is low, but it jumps to 130 basis points for high default probabilities. The model oers a general
equilibrium view of debt quantities and pries. Bond issues and defaults are endogenous hoies:
ountries faing high borrowing osts might hoose to borrow less, thereby lowering their default
risk. In the simulations, high beta ountries pay higher interest rates even if they borrow less in
equilibrium.
Two disrepanies between the model and the data are worth mentioning. First, in the model,
we an preisely measure expeted default probabilities and onsumption orrelation, so we do not
need to rely on proxies like Standard and Poor's ratings or orporate spreads. Seond, the model
only onsiders one-period bonds, whereas atual bonds have longer maturities. As as result, the
model does not take into aount interest rate risk. We leave this interesting ase out for future
researh.
This paper is related to two strands of existing literature on sovereign debt. First, this paper
ontributes to the large body of empirial literature on emerging market bond spreads. The paper
losest to ours is Longsta, Pan, Pedersen, and Singleton (2007). They study hanges in emerging
market redit default swaps spreads and nd that global fators, like the return on the U.S. stok
market and hanges in the VIX index, explain a large fration of the ommon variation in swap
spreads. They argue very onviningly that exess returns are mostly ompensation for bearing
global risk, with little or no ountry spei risk premia.
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Seond, our paper ontributes to the
theoretial literature on sovereign lending with defaults. The paper losest to ours is Arellano
(2008). She builds on the seminal work by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and develops a dynami
general equilibrium model of sovereign lending with endogenous default hoie.
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We build on her
work. The main dierene between our two models is our assumption that foreign lenders are risk
averse and not risk neutral. This assumption is ruial in generating the ross setion of portfolio
returns. We show that a model with risk neutral investors annot aount for the results of our
empirial analysis on EMBI bonds.
The paper is organized as follows. Setion 1 desribes the data, how we build EMBI portfolios,
and the main harateristis of the EMBI portfolio exess returns. Setion 2 shows that two global
risk fators explain most of the time series variation in portfolio exess returns. In setion 3, we
interpret these ndings by desribing a general equilibrium model of sovereign borrowing. Setion
1
Other referenes on the empirial determinants of sovereign spreads inlude papers by Edwards (1984), Herb,
Harvey, and Viskanta (1995), Kamin and von Kleist (1999), Arora and Cerisola (2001), Westphalen (2001), MGuire
and Shrijvers (2003), Bernoth, von Hagen, and Shukneht (2004), Favero, Pagano, and von Thadden (2005),
Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2007), Gonzalez-Rozada and Yeyati (2008), Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008) and Pan
and Singleton (2008).
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Reent papers in this segment of the literature are Bulow and Rogo (1989), Atkeson (1991), Kehoe and Levine
(1993), Zame (1993), Cole and Kehoe (2000), Alvarez and Jermann (2000), Koherlakota (1996), Amador (2003),
Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), Bi (2006), Yue (2006), Broner, Lorenzoni, and Shmukler (2005), Guerrieri and Kondor
(2008).
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4 onsiders a alibrated version of the model that qualitatively repliates our empirial ndings.
Setion 5 onludes. All the tables and gures are in the appendix.
1 The Cross-Setion of EMBI Returns
We fous on sovereign bonds issued in US dollars by emerging ountries. To study these bonds,
we take the perspetive of a US investor who borrows in dollars to invest in this bond market. We
hek that these bonds oer return that inrease with the probability of default, as measured by
Standard and Poor's ountry ratings. We unover a seond mehanism: the higher the sovereign
bond's ovariane with US orporate default risk, the higher the exess returns. Using these two
results, we build portfolios along two dimensions and obtain a ross-setion of EMBI exess returns.
We start by desribing the raw data and setting up some notations. Then we turn to our
portfolio-building methodology, and report the main harateristis of our ross-setion of EMBI
exess returns.
1.1 Data and notations
Data on Emerging Markets We fous on the set of ountries inluded in JP Morgan's EMBI
Global index. JP Morgan publishes ountry-spei and aggregate indies that market partiipants
onsider as benhmarks. The EMBI Global index overs low or middle inome per apita ountries
(aording to the World Bank's lassiation). It also inludes ountries that are urrently - or
have been in the past ten years - restruturing their external or loal debts. Our main dataset thus
ontains 36 ountries: Argentina, Belize, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Cote D'Ivoire,
Dominian Republi, Euador, Egypt, El Salvador, Hungary, Indonesia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Lebanon,
Malaysia, Mexio, Moroo, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippine, Poland, Russia, Serbia, South
Afria, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam.
The JP Morgan EMBI Global total return prie index inludes arued dividends and ash
payments. In eah ountry, the index is a market apitalization-weighted aggregate of US dollar-
denominated Brady Bonds, Eurobonds, traded loans and loal market debt instruments issued by
sovereign and quasi-sovereign entities. The weight of eah instrument in eah ountry-spei index
is determined by dividing the issue's market apitalization by the total market apitalization for all
instruments in the index. The market apitalization of eah issue orresponds to its fae value
outstanding multiplied by its bid-side settlement prie. Weights are updated at the end of eah
month (see Cavanagh and Long (1999)). These bonds are liquid debt instruments atively traded.
Their notional sizes are at least equal to $500 million. Eah issue inluded in the EMBI Global
index must have at least 2.5 years until maturity when it enters the index and at least 1 year until
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maturity to remain in the index. Moreover, JP Morgan sets liquidity riteria suh as easily aessible
and veriable daily pries either from an inter-dealer broker or a ertied JP Morgan soure.
To assess the default probability of eah ountry, we rely on Standard and Poor's ratings.
Standard and Poor's redit ratings take the form of letter grades ranging from AAA (highest redit
worthiness) to SD (seletive default). They are available for a large set of ountries over a long time
period. We ollet Standard and Poor's ratings for all the 36 ountries in the EMBI index, exept
Cote d'Ivoire and Iraq. We fous on ratings for long-term debt denominated in foreign urrenies
and onvert ratings into numbers ranging from 1 (highest redit worthiness) to 23 (lowest redit
worthiness). Our sample ontains several default episodes. Argentina, the Dominian Republi,
Euador, Russia and Uruguay defaulted on their external debt during our sample period. Argentina
was in default status from November, 2001 to May, 2005, the Dominian Republi from February,
2005 to May, 2005, Euador in July, 2000 for only one month, Russia from January, 1999 to
November, 2000 and Uruguay in May, 2003 for only one month.
Ratings are not traded pries. This obvious fat has two onsequenes. First, ratings are not
tailored to a partiular investor. For example, they are the same for a US and a Japanese investor.
As a result, ratings do not not take into aount the timing of a potential sovereign default: a
ountry that might default in good times for the US has the same rating as a ountry that might
default in bad times. Seond, for most ountries, redit ratings do not enompass all the information
on expeted defaults. They are not updated on a regular basis, but rather when new information
or events suggest the need for additional Standard and Poor's studies and grade revisions.
To omplement the Standard and Poor's ratings, it is now ommon to rely on redit default
swaps (CDS) and debt to GNP ratios. These two measures do not seem appropriate for our study.
CDS are insurane ontrats against the event that a sovereign defaults on its debt over a given
horizon (see Pan and Singleton (2008)). These ontrats are traded in US dollars. As a result,
their pries should reet both the magnitude and the timing of expeted defaults. Yet, our goal
is to disentangle these two elements. Moreover, CDS data are only available from Deember 2002
on, and for a subset of the EMBI Global ountries. Debt to GNP ratios are available for many
ountries, but at annual frequeny. These ratios do not predit default probabilities and returns as
well than Standard and Poor's ratings. To hek, however, that high debt levels do not drive our
results, we report debt to GNP ratios. Our series ome from the World Bank Global Development
Finane annual dataset. We linearly interpolate the annual debt to GNP ratios to obtain monthly
series.
As a snapshot of our dataset, Figure 1 reports, for eah ountry in JP Morgan's EMBI Global
Index, the annual stripped spread plotted against the Standard and Poor's redit rating at the end of
August 2008. The stripped spread is equal to the dierene between the average yield to maturity
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in the emerging ountry and the orresponding yield to maturity on the US Treasury spot urve,
after `stripping' out the value of any ollateralized ash ows. These spreads orrespond to the
usual representation of sovereign risk premia. Throughout the rest of the paper though, we use
index pries to ompute returns.
Notations Before turning to our portfolio-building strategy, we introdue here some useful no-
tations. Let r
e;i
denote the log exess return, inluding any arued dividends, of an Amerian
investor who borrows funds in US dollars at the log risk free rate r
f
in order to buy ountry i 's
EMBI bond and sells it after one month. His log exess return is equal to:
r
e;i
t+1
= p
i
t+1
  p
i
t
  r
f
t
;
where p
i
t
denotes the log market prie of an EMBI bond in ountry i at date t.
We dene the bond beta (
i
EMBI
) of eah ountry i 's as the slope oeÆient in a regression of
EMBI bond returns on US BBB-rated orporate bond returns:
p
i
t
= 
i
+ 
i
EMBI
r
BBB
t
+ "
t
;
where r
BBB
t
denotes the log total return on the Merrill Lynh US BBB orporate bond index.
We ompute betas on 100-day rolling windows to obtain time-series of 
i
EMBI;t
. As a timing
onvention, we date t the beta estimated with returns up to date t. For eah regression, we
estimate the beta at date t only if at least 50 observations for both the left- and right-hand side
variables are available over the previous 100-day rolling window period.
1.2 Portfolios of Exess Returns
EMBI portfolios We build portfolios of EMBI exess returns by sorting ountries along two
dimensions: their probabilities of defaults and their bond betas. First, at the end of eah period t,
we sort all ountries in the sample in two groups on the basis of their bond betas 
EMBI;t
. The rst
group ontains the ountries with the lowest 
EMBI;t
, the seond group ontains the ountries with
the highest 
EMBI;t
. Seond, we sort all ountries within eah of the two groups in three portfolios
ranked from low to high probabilities of default. We measure default probabilities with Standard and
Poor's redit ratings. As a result, we obtain six portfolios. Portfolios 1, 2 and 3 ontain ountries
with the lowest betas, portfolios 3, 4 and 5 ontain ountries with the highest betas. Portfolios 1
and 4 ontain ountries with the lowest default probabilities, portfolios 3 and 6 ontain ountries
with the highest default probabilities. Portfolios are re-balaned at the end of every month, using
information available at that point. We ompute the EMBI exess returns r
e;j
t+1
for portfolios j by
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taking the average of the EMBI exess returns in eah portfolios j over the subsequent period (e.g
between t and t + 1). The total number of ountries in our portfolios varies over time. We have
6 ountries at the beginning of the sample in January, 1995 and 32 at the end in August, 2008.
3
The maximum number of ountries attained during the sample is 32.
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Table 1 provides an overview of our six EMBI portfolios. For eah portfolio j , we report the
average foreign bond beta 
j
EMBI
, the average total exess return r
e;j
, the average Standard and
Poor's redit rating and the average external debt to GNP ratio. All returns are reported in US
dollars and the moments are annualized: we multiply the mean of the monthly return by 12 and the
standard deviation by
p
12. The Sharpe ratio is the ratio of the annualized mean to the annualized
standard deviation.
Our portfolios highlight two simple empirial fats. Exess returns inrease from low to high
betas: portfolio 1, 2 and 3 (low betas) oer lower exess returns than portfolios 4, 5 and 6 (high
betas). Exess returns also inrease from low to high default probabilities: portfolios 1 and 4 (low
default probabilities) oer lower exess returns than portfolios 3 and 6 (high default probabilities).
The average exess return on all the low beta portfolios is 650 basis points per annum. For the
high beta portfolios, it is 940 basis points. As a result, there is almost a 300 basis points dierene
between high and low beta portfolios. For low beta ountries, the spread between low and high
default probabilities entails a 340 basis point dierene in returns. For high beta ountries, this
dierene jumps to almost 900 basis points. On average, the spread due to default probabilities is
lose to 600 basis points. These two empirial fats square well with intuition. An investor reeives
higher returns to ompensate for higher default probabilities. If the investor is risk-averse, then he
expets higher returns for assets that o-vary with his return on wealth.
These spreads are eonomially and statistially signiant. As a bak-of-the-envelope hek
to this point, note that the standard error on the mean estimate is approximately equal to the
standard deviation of the exess returns divided by the square root of the number of observations.
The average standard deviation is equal to 12 perent. The sample size is 164 quarters (12:8
2
).
The standard error on the mean is thus below 1 perent, approximately equal to 95 basis points. A
spread of 300 basis points orresponds to three times the standard deviation of the mean.
Patton and Timmermann (2008) propose a more preise test of these ross-setional properties.
We use their non-parametri test to examine whether there exists a monotoni mapping from the
observable variables used to sort EMBI ountries into portfolios, and expeted returns. The test
3
Daily historial levels of the EMBI indies are available from Deember 31, 1993 onwards for a limited set of
ountries. We need at least six ountries in the sample to start building our six portfolios and thus start in January
1995.
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Table 13 in the appendix reports the frequeny of realloation aross portfolios. Figure 3 in the appendix fouses
on the examples of Argentina and Mexio.
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rejets at standard signiane levels the null of the absene of a monotoni relationship between
portfolio ranks and returns against the alternative of an inreasing pattern (the p-value is 1:5%).
By sorting ountries along their Standard and Poor's ratings and bond betas, we have obtained
a rih ross-setion of average exess returns. We now turn to the dynami properties of these
portfolios.
2 Common Risk Fators in EMBI Exess Returns
In this setion, we show that two risk fators reprodue our ross-setion of exess returns. To
build our risk fators, we start o a statistial desription of our portfolios.
2.1 Prinipal Component Analysis
A prinipal omponent analysis provides a simple framework for extrating fators that are important
for apturing ommon variation in asset returns. Let  be the sample ovariane matrix of exess
returns on the original set of EMBI portfolios R
e
. The eigenvalue deomposition of this ovariane
matrix
 = QQ
0
yields a new ovariane matrix  whih is diagonal, and the orthogonal transformation matrix
Q whih satises QQ
0
= I. This matrix ontains the loadings of the original portfolios on the
orthogonal ommon fators (or prinipal omponents) . These new portfolios exess returns are:
R˜
e
= Q
0
R
e
:
Sine the original test assets are exess returns, this proedure also reates zero-investment portfo-
lios, i.e. the resulting fators are exess returns. The variane-ovariane matrix of these portfolios
is the diagonal matrix  above. Table 2 reports the loadings of our EMBI portfolios on eah of the
prinipal omponents (i.e. the Q matrix) as well as the fration of the total variane of portfolio
returns attributed to eah prinipal omponent (diag=tr).
This prinipal omponent analysis reveals that 80 perent of the portfolio exess returns om-
mon variation is explained by the rst two prinipal omponents. The rst prinipal omponent
is indistinguishable from the mean portfolio exess returns, while the seond prinipal omponent
is highly orrelated with the dierene between the sixth and rst portfolio. Following this de-
omposition, we onsider two risk fators, the average EMBI exess returns, denoted R
EMBI
, and
the dierene between the last and rst portfolio, denoted LS
EMBI
beause it is equivalent to the
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exess return of a zero-ost strategy that goes long on the last portfolio and short on the rst. The
orrelation of the rst prinipal omponent with R
EMBI
is 0.99, and the orrelation between the
seond prinipal omponent and LS
EMBI
is -0.83. We nd that a large fration of the ross-setion
of EMBI exess returns desribed in setion 1 an be explained by their ovarianes with just two
risk fators, the EMBI market exess return (R
EMBI
) and the return from a strategy that goes long
on the last portfolio, and short on the rst (LS
EMBI
). We now review the ross-setional asset
priing methodology and then report our results.
2.2 Asset Priing Methodology
Cross-Setional Asset Priing We use R
e;j
t+1
to denote the average exess return on portfolio j
in period t + 1. In the absene of arbitrage opportunities, this exess return has a zero prie and
satises the following Euler equation:
E
t
[M
t+1
R
e;j
t+1
℄ = 0;
where M denotes the stohasti disount fator of the US investor. We assume that the log
stohasti disount fator m is linear in the priing fators f :
m
t+1
= 1  b(f
t+1
  );
where b is the vetor of fator loadings and  denotes the fator means. This linear fator model
implies a beta priing model: the log expeted exess return is equal to the fator prie  times the
beta of eah portfolio 
j
:
E[r˜
e;j
℄ = 
0

j
where r˜
e;j
denotes the log exess return on portfolio j orreted for its Jensen term,  = 
f f
b,
f f
=
E(f
t
 
f
)
0
is the variane-ovariane matrix of the fator, and 
j
denotes the regression oeÆients
of the return R
e;j
on the fators. To estimate the fator pries  and the portfolio betas , we
use two dierent proedures: a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) applied to linear fator
models, following Hansen (1982), and a two-stage OLS estimation following Fama and MaBeth
(1973), heneforth FMB.
We briey desribe these two tehniques.
GMM The moment onditions are the sample analog of the populations priing errors:
g
T
(b) = E
T
(m
t
r˜
e
t
) = E
T
(r˜
e
t
)  E
T
(r˜
e
t
f
0
t
)b;
10
where r˜
e
t
= [r˜
e;1
t
; r˜
e;2
t
; :::; r˜
e;N
t
℄
0
groups all the N EMBI portfolios. In the rst stage of the GMM
estimation, we use the identity matrix as the weighting matrix, while in the seond stage we
use the inverse of the spetral density S matrix of the priing errors in the rst stage: S =∑
E[(m
t
r˜
e
t
)(m
t j
r˜
e
t j
)
0
℄:
5
We use demeaned fators in both stages. Sine we fous on linear fators
models, the rst stage is equivalent to an OLS ross-setional regression of average returns on the
seond moment of returns and fators. The seond stage is a GLS ross-setional regression of
average exess returns on the seond moment of returns and fators.
FMB In the rst stage of the FMB proedure, for eah portfolio j , we run a time-series regression
of the EMBI exess returns r˜
e
t
on a onstant and the fators f
t
, in order to estimate 
j
. The only
dierene with the rst stage of the GMM proedure stems from the presene of a onstant in the
regressions. In the seond stage, we run a ross-setional regression of the average exess returns
E
T
(m
t
r˜
e
t
) on the betas that were estimated in the rst stage, to estimate the fator pries . The
rst stage GMM estimates and the FMB point estimates are idential, beause we do not inlude
a onstant in the seond step of the FMB proedure. Finally, we an bak out the fator loadings
b from the fator pries and ovariane matrix of the fators.
2.3 Results
Table 3 reports our asset priing results. We fous rst on market pries of risk and then turn to
the quantities of risk in our portfolios.
Market Pries of Risk The top panel of the table reports estimates of the market prie of risk
 and the SDF fator loadings b, the adjusted R
2
, the square-root of mean-squared errors RMSE
and the p-values of 
2
tests (in perentage points). The market prie of risk of the R
EMBI
risk
fator is equal to 780 basis points per annum. The FMB standard error is 272 basis points. The
market prie of risk of the LS
EMBI
risk fator is equal to 980 basis points per annum and the FMB
standard error is 325 basis points. In both ases, the risk prie is more than two standard errors from
zero, and thus highly statistially signiant. Overall, asset priing errors are small. The RMSE
is around 114 basis points and the adjusted R
2
is 78 perent. The null that the priing errors are
zero annot be rejeted, regardless of the estimation proedure. Figure 2 plots predited against
realized exess returns for the six EMBI portfolios. Clearly, the model's predited exess returns
are onsistent with the average exess returns. Note that predited exess returns orrespond here
5
We use a Newey and West (1987) approximation of the spetral density matrix The optimal number of lags is
determined using Andrews (1991)'s riterion with a maximum of 6 lags.
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simply the OLS estimates of the betas times the sample mean of the fators, not the estimated
pries of risk.
Sine the fators are returns, the no arbitrage ondition implies that risk pries should be equal
to the fators' average exess returns. This ondition stems from the fat that the Euler equation
applies to the risk fator itself, whih learly has a regression oeÆient  of one on itself. In
our estimation, this no-arbitrage ondition is satised. The average portfolio exess return is 794
basis points. So the estimated prie of risk for R
EMBI
is only 14 basis points removed from the
point estimate implied by linear fator priing. The average exess return on the strategy that goes
long on the last portfolio and short on the rst is 910 basis points. So the estimated prie of risk
of LS
EMBI
is 70 basis points removed from the point estimate. The standard error on the mean
estimate is equal to 88 basis points. As a onsequene, the mean is not statistially dierent from
the market prie of risk.
Alphas and betas in EMBI returns The bottom panel of Table 3 reports the onstants (de-
noted 
j
) and the slope oeÆients (denoted 
j
R
EMBI
and 
j
LS
EMBI
) obtained by running time-series
regressions of eah portfolio's exess returns r˜ x
e;j
on a onstant and the R
EMBI
and LS
EMBI
risk
fators.
The rst olumn reports 's estimates. The s for eah portfolio are generally small and not
signiantly dierent from zero. The null that the s are jointly zero is rejeted at the 5 perent
signiane level. The seond olumn reports the s for the R
EMBI
fator. These s inrease
monotonially from 0.95 to 1.44 for the low 
EMBI
group, while for the seond 
EMBI
group they
inrease from 0.54 for portfolio 4 to 0.97 for portfolio 5 and then slightly derease to 0.95 for
portfolio 6. The third olumn reports the s for the LS
EMBI
fator. These s are negative for the
low 
EMBI
group and positive for the high 
EMBI
group. The higher default probability, high bond
betas portfolio oers high exess returns on average beause they loads more heavily on the risk
fators.
By sorting ountries along their Standard and Poor's ratings and bond betas, we have obtained
a ross-setion of average exess returns whih reets dierent risk exposures. To move from a
statistial desription of the risk fators to their eonomi interpretation, we now speify a general
equilibrium model of sovereign borrowing that an potentially repliate our previous ndings. The
main intuition is as follows. When investors are risk averse and the endowment proess in the
borrowing ountry is potentially orrelated with lenders' marginal utilities of onsumption, the priing
of a sovereign bond depends not only on the probability of default but also on its orrelation with
the investors' stohasti disount fator.
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3 A General Equilibrium Model of Sovereign Borrowing
In this setion, we build a N-ountry model of sovereign borrowing to interpret the empirial proper-
ties of the EMBI portfolios doumented in the previous setion. We start o the seminal two-ountry
models of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and Arellano (2008).
6
But we depart from the previous lit-
erature and assume that lenders are risk averse, instead of being risk-neutral, and that emerging
ountries' business yles dier in their orrelations to the US business yle.
This simple departure has key impliations on sovereign bond pries. We know that emerging
ountries tend to default when they experiene diÆult eonomi onditions. Again, if bad times
in emerging ountries orrespond to bad times for the investor, then sovereign bonds appear risky:
they pay badly in bad times. A risk-averse investor will expet to be ompensated for that risk: he
will earn on average a premium on these bonds, or equivalently, these bonds will trade at a lower
value than their simple, disounted expeted payos. If bad times in emerging ountries orrespond
to good times for the investor, then sovereign bonds appear less risky: they pay badly in good times,
and well in bad times. If the investor is risk-averse, these bonds trade at a higher value than their
simple, disounted expeted payos.
3.1 Endowments
We explore this mehanism and its general equilibrium impliations. In the model, there are N-1
small, emerging open eonomies, and one large developed eonomy. In eah small open eonomy,
there is a representative agent who reeives a stohasti endowment stream. In what follows, the
supersript B (for `borrowers') denotes variables orresponding to the N-1 small open eonomies,
the supersript L (for `lenders') the large developed eonomy. Upper ase variables denote levels,
lower ase variables denote logs. The ountries' log endowments evolve as:
y
B;i
t
= y
B
+ 
B
y
B;i
t 1
+ 
B;i
t
; (3.1)
where the shok 
B;i
is i :i :d normal. All emerging ountries have the same endowment persistene
and volatility: E([
B;i
℄
2
) = 
2

B
. In the large developed eonomy, there is a representative agent
that reeives every period an exogenous onsumption endowment. We assume that idiosynrati
shoks to onsumption growth are i :i :d: log-normally distributed:

L
t
= 
L
+ 
L
t
:
6
The literature on sovereign debt modeling is large. Important examples are Bulow and Rogo (1989), Atkeson
(1991), Kehoe and Levine (1993), Zame (1993), Cole and Kehoe (2000), Alvarez and Jermann (2000), Koherlakota
(1996), Amador (2003), Aguiar and Gopinath (2006).
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The emerging ountries only dier aording to their onditional orrelation to the developed
eonomy: E(
B;i
0

L
) = 
i
.
All variables in the model are real, and we abstrat from monetary poliies. In eah emerging
eonomy, a benevolent government maximizes the welfare of its representative itizen. To do so,
the government an borrow resoures from the developed ountry. The government, however, an
only trade non ontingent one-period zero oupon bonds. These debt ontrats are not enforeable:
the government an hoose to default on its debts at any point in time. In this set-up, if investors
are risk neutral, the prie of a sovereign bond depends exlusively on the endogenous probability of
default, whih varies with the amount of funds borrowed and the expeted next-period endowment.
As a result, sovereign bond pries only depend on ountry-spei harateristis and the large
ommon variation in bond pries observed in the data an only be explained by a high degree of
orrelation aross the ountries' endowment proesses, leaving no role for systemati risk fators
related to foreign investors. But if investors are risk-averse, then sovereign bond pries reet the
orrelation between the emerging eonomy' business yle and the US eonomy.
3.2 Borrowers
We start with the desription of the borrowers. The representative agent in eah small open
eonomy maximizes the stream of disounted utilities U
B
:
U
B
= E
t
1∑
t=0
(
B
)
t
U
B
t
= E
t
1∑
t=0
(
B
)
t
(C
B
t
)
 
1  
;
where 
B
denotes the time disount fator, and C
B
t
denotes onsumption at time t. We let the
lenders' and borrowers' disount fators dier beause developing ountries tend to have higher real
risk free rates than emerging ountries.
7
The representative household reeives a stohasti stream of the tradable good Y
B
t
every period.
We assume that y
B
t
, the log of the borrower's endowment, follows a Markov proess. The repre-
sentative agent also reeives a goods transfer from the government in a lump-sum fashion: i.e, any
proeeds from international operations are rebated lump-sum from the government to its itizens.
The government has aess to international apital markets: at the beginning of period t, it an
purhase B
t+1
t
one-period zero-oupon bonds at prie Q
t
. B
t+1
t
denotes the quantity of one-period
zero-oupon bonds purhased at date t and oming to maturity at date t + 1. A positive value for
B
t+1
t
represents a saving for the borrowing ountry, whih supplies Q
t
B
t+1
t
units of period t goods
7
Politial eonomists argue that politiians tend to have shorter time horizons in small developing ountries. In
Amador (2003) for example, a low value for the disount fator 
B
orresponds to the high short-term disount rate
of an inumbent party with low probability of remaining in power in a model where dierent parties alternate.
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in order to reeive B
t+1
t
> 0 units of goods in the following period. On the ontrary, a negative
value B
t+1
t
< 0 implies borrowing Q
t
B
t+1
t
units of goods at t and promising to repay, onditional
on not defaulting, B
t+1
t
units of t + 1 good. The representative household's budget onstraint
onditional on not defaulting at time t is then:
C
B
t
= Y
B
t
 Q
t
B
t+1
t
+ B
t
t 1
: (3.2)
In ase of default, all urrent debt disappears. This simplifying assumption implies that the
sovereign annot seletively default on parts of its debt.
8
A sovereign that defaults at date t is
exluded from international apital markets for a stohasti number of periods and suers a diret
output loss. In this ase, onsumption is onstrained by the value of output during autarky, whih
is denoted Y
def
t
, and the budget onstraint is simply:
C
B
t
= Y
B;def
t
: (3.3)
Following Arellano (2008), we assume an asymmetri diret output ost of default. In partiular,
Y
B;def
t
= minfY
B
;
^
Y
B
g, where
^
Y
B
is the output upper bound in ase of a default and it is dened
as (1  )mean(Y
B
). This form of diret output ost implies that defaults are more ostly in good
times. A ountry that reeives a high value of Y
B
expets high values of the endowment also
in the near future, given the high persistene of the endowment proess. If the ountry defaults
when Y
B
is high, its onsumption is set to be low for the entire time of exlusion from apital
markets aording to the budget onstraint (3.3). When the endowment is high, the utility ost of
default (whih lasts several periods) is likely to outweigh the utility benet from not repaying the
outstanding debt (whih lasts one period). This spei way of modeling the output ost is ritial
for this lass of models to produe a ounter-ylial urrent aount. In fat, this assumption
onstraints the timing of borrowing. Consider a ountry that reeives a partiularly low value of
the endowment. This ountry would like to borrow to smooth out onsumption. Given the high
persistene of the endowment proess, this ountry also expets low values of the endowment in
the near future. If the endowment is low enough and the ountry defaults, the diret output ost
is likely to be low for the entire exlusion period (beause Y
B
<
^
Y
B
). At the same time, when the
endowment is low, the marginal utility ost of a net apital outow is very high for a risk averse
borrower. Investors antiipate that the borrower is likely to default in this ase and they require a
high premium to supply any funds. In equilibrium, when Y
B
is low enough, there is no borrowing
and the sovereign is redit-rationed. Therefore, this assumption aets both the size and timing of
8
Bolton and Jeanne (2008) and DuÆe, Perdersen, and Singleton (2003) are models where the sovereign an
seletively default on part of the outstanding debt.
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debt in equilibrium.
Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) use a model similar to Arellano (2008), but with a ost of default
that is a xed proportion of the borrower's endowment. Comparing their results to Arellano (2008),
they obtain larger debt to GDP ratios, lower default probabilities and lower interest rate spreads, and
they annot reprodue the ounter-yliality of the urrent aount. We hoose the default ost
assumption used in Arellano (2008) beause it is a onvenient way to ensure that ountries borrow
more when output is above trend, a robust feature of emerging eonomies' business yle (see for
example Neumeyer and Perri (2005), Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) or Uribe and Yue (2006)). A
seond reason to use the default ost assumption in Arellano (2008) is the fat that ountries tend
to default when output is below trend (Tomz (2007)) and it is diÆult to determine whether the
fall in output is the reason for defaulting, or rather the onsequene of the default.
A seond onsequene of a ountry's default is exlusion from international apital markets. In
Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) exlusion is permanent, and default is not an equilibrium outome. We
follow Arellano (2008) and assume that exlusion lasts a stohasti number of periods. Although
this assumption implies a degree of oordination by foreign investors that is partially at odds with
the assumption that investors behave ompetitively, it aptures the fat that ountries in default
do not aess international apital markets for some time. As Hathondo, Martinez, and Sapriza
(2007) note, in this framework, the equilibrium size of debt is smaller when the exlusion from
apital markets is shorter. This is beause exlusion works an inentive to repay, thus reassuring
lenders, dereasing the risk premium and allowing more borrowing.
3.3 Lenders
We now turn to the desription of the lenders. The representative agent reeives an exogenous
stohasti onsumption endowment every period denoted C
L
t
. Lenders are risk-averse and behave
ompetitively. In order to reprodue the large spread between low and high beta ountries, we rely
on habit preferenes similar to Campbell and Cohrane (1999). We assume that lenders maximize
the stream of disounted utilities U
L
:
U
L
= E
t
1∑
t=0
(
L
)
t
U
L
t
= E
t
1∑
t=0
(
L
)
t
(C
L
t
  H
L
t
)
1 
  1
1  
;
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where 
L
denotes the lenders' disount fator and H
t
the external habit level.
9
The external habit
level orresponds to a time-varying subsistene level or soial externality.
Habit preferenes reprodue quantitatively the eet of the timing of defaults on bond spreads.
We show in the appendix that a model where borrowers and lenders have the same power utility
preferenes does not produe a large spread in exess returns. The maximum spread between high
and low orrelation groups in the latter ase is only 55 basis points, an order of magnitude smaller
than in the data. This result parallels the equity premium puzzle in Mehra and Presott (1985).
To illustrate this point, assume that two ountries have the same default probability and the same
yield volatility. Then the spreads between their bond returns depend on the ovariane between the
US marginal utility of onsumption and the return dierenes. As a result, the maximum spread
between these two ountries is twie the produt of the risk-aversion oeÆient times the standard
deviation of onsumption growth (around 1.5 perent) and the standard deviation of the returns
(around 6 perent). A risk-aversion oeÆient of 2 would imply a maximum spread of 18 basis
points. A risk-aversion oeÆient lose to 40 would then lead to a spread of 4 perent as in the
data, but it would also imply a very high and volatile risk free rate. On the ontrary, the introdution
of habit preferenes implies that lenders' risk aversion is time-varying, and higher in 'bad times'. As
onsumption delines toward the habit in 'bad times', the urvature of the utility funtion rises, so
risky assets pries fall and expeted returns rise. Loal risk-aversion is sometimes very high, even
of the risk-aversion oeÆient remains low.
Following Campbell and Cohrane (1999), we assume that the external habit level depends on the
onsumption endowment through the following autoregressive proess for the surplus onsumption
ratio, dened as the perentage gap between the endowment and habit (S
L
t
 [C
L
t
  H
L
t
℄=C
L
t
):
s
L
t+1
= (1  )s
L
+ s
L
t
+ (s
L
t
)(
L
t+1
  
L
);
where 
L
is the average onsumption growth. The sensitivity funtion (s
L
t
) desribes how
habits are formed from past aggregate endowments. In this framework, `bad times' refers to times
of low surplus onsumption ratios (when onsumption is lose to the habit level), and `negative
shoks' refers to negative onsumption growth shoks 
L
. The sensitivity funtion (s
L
t
) governs
the dynami of the surplus onsumption ratio:
9
Some further examples of habit preferenes in one-ountry models are Constantinides (1990), Abel (1990), Jermann
(1998), Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001), Lettau and Uhlig (2000). Chapman (2002) shows that models with
intrinsi habit formation where eah individual's habit is determined by his onsumption, and not everyone else's
onsumption, annot solve the equity premium puzzle without relying on very high values for the risk aversion oeÆient.
We abstrat from this diÆulty and onsider only external habits.
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(s
L
t
) =
{
1
S
L
√
1  2(s
L
t
  s
L
)  1 if s
L
t
 s
L
max
0 elsewhere,
where S
L
and s
L
max
are respetively the steady-state and upper bound of the surplus-onsumption
ratio. S
L
measures the steady-state gap (in perentage) between onsumption and habit levels.
Note that the non-linearity of the surplus onsumption ratio keeps habits always below onsumption
and marginal utilities always positive and nite. Assuming that S
L
= 

L
√

1 
and s
L
max
= s
L
+(1 
S
L
)=2, the sensitivity funtion leads to a onstant risk free rate: r
t
= r =  ln(
L
) + 
L
 

2

2

L
2S
L
2
.
This model delivers time-varying risk aversion for the lenders. Sine the habit level depends on
aggregate onsumption, the loal urvature of the lenders' utility funtion is 
t
= =S
L
t
. When the
endowment is lose to the habit level, the surplus onsumption ratio is low and the lender very risk
averse.
Lenders supply any quantity of funds demanded by the small open eonomy, but they require
ompensation for the risk they bear. Lenders annot default. In Arellano (2008), lenders are risk-
neutral. In that ase, lenders harge the borrower the interest rate that makes them break-even in
expeted value. In our model, lenders are risk-averse, and require not only a default premium, but
also a default risk premium. They expet a higher return on average if defaults are more likely in
bad times for them, i.e when their endowment is lose to the habit level.
3.4 Reursive equilibrium
In order to desribe the eonomy at time t, we need to keep trak of the borrower's endowment
stream, his outstanding debt, and the lender's past surplus onsumption ratios. Let y
B
and s
L
denote the history of events up to t: y
B
= (y
B
0
; :::; y
B
t
) and s
L
= (s
L
0
; :::; s
L
t
). We denote x a
olumn vetor that summarizes this information: x = [y
B
; s
L
℄
0
. Given that the two stohasti
endowment proesses are Markovian, we denote f (x
0
; x) the onditional density of x
0
, e.g. the
value of x at time t+1 given the initial value of x at time t. In what follows, the value of a variable
in period t + 1 is denoted with a prime supersript.
Given the initial state of the eonomy, the value of the default option is:
v
o
(B; x) = maxfv

(B;B
0
; x); v
d
(x)g;
where v

(B;B
0
; x) denotes the ontrat ontinuation value and v
d
the value of defaulting. If the
government hooses to repay the debt oming to maturity, it an purhase some new debt. As a
result, the value of staying in the ontrat is a funtion of the exogenous states y
B
and s
L
, the
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quantity of debt oming to maturity at time B and future debt B
0
. In ase of default, all outstanding
debt is erased, and the small eonomy is fored into autarky for a stohasti number of periods.
Hene, the only state variables that inuene the value v
d
of defaulting are y
B
and s
L
. We now
dene more preisely v

and v
d
.
The value of default depends on the probability of re-aessing nanial markets in the future
and on the urrent output loss:
v
d
(x) = u
B
(y
def
) + 
∫
x
0
[v
o
(0; x
0
) + (1  )v
d
(x
0
)℄f (x
0
; x)dx
0
;
where  is the exogenous probability of re-entering international apital markets after a default.
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As
we have seen, when a borrower defaults, onsumption is equal to the autarky value of output. In the
following period, the borrower regains aess to international apital markets with no outstanding
debt with probability , or remains in autarky with probability 1  .
The value of staying in the ontrat and repaying debt oming to maturity is:
v

(B; x) = Max
B
0
fu() + 
∫
x
0
v
o
(B
0
; x
0
)f (x
0
; x)dx
0
g;
subjet to the budget onstraint (3.2). The borrower hooses B
0
to maximize utility and antiipates
that the equilibrium bond prie depends on the exogenous states variable and on the new debt B
0
.
Let  denotes the set of possible values for the exogenous states x . For eah value of B,
the small open eonomy default poliy is the set D(B) of exogenous states suh that the value of
default is larger than the value of staying in the ontrat:
D(B) = fx 2  : v
d
(x) > v

(B; x)g:
Similarly, R(B) is the set of exogenous states suh that the value of default is smaller than the
value of staying in the ontrat. The repayment set R(B) is the omplement to D(B):
R(B) = fx 2  : v
d
(x)  v

(B; x)g:
The default probability dp is endogenous and depends on the amount of outstanding debt and
on the endowment realization. In partiular, the default probability is related to the default set
through:
dp(B
0
; x) =
∫
D(B
0
)
f (x
0
; x)dx
0
;
where dp(B
0
; x) denotes the expetation at time t of a default at time t +1 for a given level B
0
of
10
Kovrijnykh and Szentes (2007) explore the possibility of endogenizing .
19
outstanding debt due at time t + 1.
3.5 Bond Pries
Bond pries Q(B
0
; x) are a funtion of the urrent state vetor x and the desired level of borrowing
B
0
. If borrowers do not default at date t + 1, lenders reeive payos equal to the fae value of the
bonds, whih is normalized to 1. In ase of default at date t + 1, payos are zero. Starting from
the investor's Euler equation, the bond prie funtion is:
Q(B
0
; x) = E[M
0
1
1 dp(B
0
;x)
℄ = E[M
0
℄E[1
1 dp(B
0
;x)
℄ + ov [M
0
; 1
1 dp(B
0
;x)
℄; (3.4)
where M
0
is the investors' stohasti disount fator and is equal to:
M
0
= 
L
U

L(C
0
; H
0
)
U

L(C;H)
= 
L
(
S
0
S
C
L
0
C
L
)
 
= 
L
e
 [
L
+( 1)(s
L
t
 s
L
)+(1+(s
L
t
))(
L
t+1
 
L
)℄
:
A risk free asset pays one unit of onsumption good in any state of the world and has a prie equal
to Q
r f
= E[M
0
℄. If investors are risk-neutral, sovereign bond pries depend only on expeted default
probabilities: Q(B
0
; x) == E[1
1 dp(B
0
;x)
℄=Q
r f
. Investors' risk aversion introdue a new omponent
to sovereign bond priing. For a given default probability, bond pries depend on the ovariane
between investors' stohasti disount fators and default events. If defaults tend to our in bad
times for investors (e.g when their marginal utility of onsumption is high), the ovariane term in
(3.4) is negative, bond pries are low and yields are high. Likewise, if defaults tend to our in good
times for investors, yields are low.
4 Simulation
We simulate the model at quarterly frequeny. We start by rapidly reviewing its parameters. We
alibrate the borrower's endowment proess desribed in (3.1) using the parameters in Arellano
(2008). These parameters desribe Argentina. We alibrate lenders' onsumption growth using
the post-war U.S. eonomy as a referene. Habit preferene parameters are from Campbell and
Cohrane (1999). Table 4 reports all the parameters used in the simulation.
The diret output ost of default  is equal to 2:5 perent per period in line with the evidene
of a signiant output drop in the aftermath of a default (see, for example, Rose (2005)). The
probability of re-entering apital markets after a default  is equal to 12:5 perent per period,
implying an average exlusion of 8 quarters. The empirial evidene on the time-length of exlusion
is mixed. For example, Gelos, Sahay, and Sandleris (2004) nd that in the 1980s the average time
20
of exlusion is 4.7 years, while only 0.3 years in the 1990s.
11
The risk aversion parameter  in the borrowers' and lenders' utility funtion is set equal to 2.
Lenders disount future at the annualized rate 
L
= 0:89, while the borrower has a lower time
disount fator 
B
= 0:83. The value of  and 
L
are alibrated in order to math an average US
real log risk-free rate of 0.94 perent per annum. Models of this lass require low values for 
B
in order to generate larger values for the debt to GDP ratio. For example, Aguiar and Gopinath
(2006) use an annualized value for 
B
equal to 0:59. We take 
B
from Arellano (2008). A low
value for 
B
mathes the usually high real interest rates in emerging markets. The omputational
algorithm is desribed in the appendix.
4.1 Building Portfolios of Simulated Data
In equilibrium, investors know expeted default probabilities and require higher risk premia from
borrowers that are more likely to default when investors' onsumption is lose to their habit levels.
We solve our model for a set of 34 uniformly spaed dierent values of 
i
, whih is the orrelation
between investors' onsumption growth and borrower's endowments. These orrelation oeÆients
are in the range [ :5; :5℄. Eah 
i
orresponds to a dierent sovereign borrower. We simulate
time series data for ountries that dier only with respet to 
i
and fae the same time series for
investors' onsumption growth. The values for all the other parameters are those in Table 4.
We use the simulated data to build portfolios that mimi the EMBI portfolios desribed in setion
1. What are the equivalents to Standard and Poor's ratings and EMBI bond betas that we used
in setion 1 on atual data? In the model, expeted default probabilities exist in losed form. We
do not need to rely on ratings to proxy them. We denote E[dp
i
℄ the investors' expetation that
ountry i will default next period. In the model, we also have a more diret measure of the business
yle's orrelation with the US eonomy than the bond betas we previously omputed. Here, we
obtain 
i
SIM
as the slope oeÆient from a regression of the borrower i 's past output growth up
to time t on a onstant and the investor's past endowment growth up to time t. We use a rolling
window of 250 periods.
The building portfolio strategy runs again in two steps. First, at the end of eah period t,
we sort all ountries in the sample into 2 groups on the basis of the observed 
i
SIM
at that time.
The rst group ontains ountries with the lowest 
i
SIM
, the seond group ontains ountries with
the highest 
i
SIM
. Seond, at the end of eah period t, we sort all ountries within eah of the
previous 2 groups into 3 portfolios on the basis of the expeted default probability E[dp
i
℄ at that
11
Argentina defaulted in 2001 and the restrutured three quarters of the $95 billion defaulted debt in a 2005 swap.
But in September 2008 Argentina still faed legal ations by investors holding out for full repayment. Argentina ould
not issue new debt on international apital markets for fear it ould be embargoed (Finanial Times, 25 September,
2008)
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time. Within eah group, the rst portfolio ontains ountries with the smallest expeted default
probabilities and the last portfolio ontains ountries with the highest default probabilities. The 6
portfolios are re-balaned at the end of every period. For eah portfolio j , we ompute the exess
returns r
e;j
t+1
by taking the average of the exess returns in the portfolio. Exess returns orrespond
to the returns in emerging ountries minus the risk-free rate in the large, developed eonomy. We
have a total of 34 simulated ountries, for 5,000 quarters. We ompute 
j
SIM
starting in quarter
500 and use the last 600 quarters for our analysis (150 years). Countries in default in a given
quarter are exluded from the sample, given that they do not have aess to international apital
markets. As a result, the total number of ountries in our portfolios varies slightly over time. Table
5 provides an overview of the 6 portfolios.
For eah portfolio j , we report the average value for 
j
SIM
, the exess return r
e;j
, the expeted
default probability E[dp
j
℄ and the debt to output ratio. All the moments are annualized: we multiply
the mean of the quarterly data by 4 and the standard deviation by 2. The Sharpe ratio is the ratio
of the annualized mean to the annualized standard deviation.
The rst panel reports the average 
j
SIM
for ountries in portfolio j . There is a stark ontrast
between the rst three and the last three portfolios. The business yle of ountries with a low

j
SIM
is negatively orrelated with the investors' endowment growth. These ountries on average
default more frequently when investors' onsumption is high and above their habit levels. On the
ontrary, ountries with a high 
j
SIM
default more frequently when investors' onsumption is low
and lose to their habit levels. The seond panel reports average expeted default probabilities.
Within eah 
low;high
SIM
-group, there is a ross-setion of average default probabilities, with a spread
up to 2.5 perent. These rst two panels orrespond to the sorting variables.
Let us turn now to average exess returns. Countries with higher default probabilities oer
higher returns. This is the rst order eet, with a dierene of around 250 basis points between
portfolios with low default probabilities (1 and 4) and portfolios with high default probabilities (3
and 6). Countries with larger values of 
j
SIM
pay higher returns. This is true at all levels of default
probabilities. This is the seond order eet. The dierene in exess returns between low and high
beta ountries is partiularly striking for ountries with high default probabilities. It amounts to 130
basis points annually. This spread is signiant.
12
It is not due to higher levels of debt, as the last
panel shows. It is atually the opposite: high beta ountries pay higher interest rates even if they
borrow less in equilibrium. These features eho the harateristis of our EMBI bond portfolios.
Comparing these spreads to their atual ounterparts reported in table 1, we note, however, that
both default probability and beta spreads are twie larger in the data than in the model.
12
Here again, we use Patton and Timmermann (2008)'s MR non parametri test. It rejets at any onventional
signiane levels the null of the absene of a monotoni relationship between portfolio ranks and expeted returns
against the alternative of an inreasing pattern.
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Table 10 reports the properties of portfolios formed on data obtained from the model's simulation
with risk neutral lenders as in Arellano (2008). When investors are risk neutral, ountries with higher
default probabilities oer higher returns. But it is not the ase that high 
SIM
ountries pay higher
returns and borrow less than low 
SIM
ountries.
Finally, Table 6 reports the prinipal omponent analysis of portfolios obtained on simulated
data with risk-averse investors. Here again, the rst two prinipal omponents explain more than
80 perent of the total variane. The rst prinipal omponent is lose to the average return aross
all portfolios, while the seond prinipal omponent orresponds to an investment strategy that goes
long the low-beta ountries and short the high-beta ountries. This prinipal omponent analysis
parallels the one obtained on atual data and reported in Table 2.
5 Conlusion
In this paper, we show that sovereign bond betas govern sovereign bond spreads. In the data,
ountries with higher bond betas pay higher borrowing rates. The dierene in spreads between
ountries with high and low betas is about 300 basis points. This is about half the spread dierene
between low and high default probability ountries.
Models of optimal borrowing and endogenous defaults with risk neutral investors annot aount
for our empirial ndings. We oer one example of a general equilibrium model of sovereign
borrowing and defaults with risk-averse investors. In the model, borrowing ountries only dier along
one dimension: their endowments are more or less orrelated to the lenders' onsumption. Habit
preferenes lead to sizable spreads in returns between low and high default probability ountries,
and between high and low beta ountries.
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Table 1: EMBI Portfolios Sorted on Credit Ratings and Bond Betas
Portfolios 1 2 3 4 5 6

j
EMBI
Low High
S&P Low Medium High Low Medium High
EMBI-US BBB beta: 
j
EMBI
Mean 0:05 0:07  0:03 0:74 0:71 0:66
Std 0:45 0:48 0:55 0:41 0:54 0:53
S&P Default Rating: dp
j
Mean 9:86 11:97 14:71 8:41 10:67 14:11
Std 1:29 0:87 1:67 1:70 1:39 1:34
Exess Return: r
e;j
Mean 4:83 6:43 8:24 4:94 9:29 13:90
Std 10:47 12:30 16:09 8:23 11:26 13:59
SR 0:46 0:52 0:51 0:60 0:83 1:02
Debt/GNP: d
j
Mean 0:44 0:45 0:56 0:41 0:44 0:51
Std 0:16 0:12 0:13 0:10 0:12 0:13
Notes: This table reports, for eah portfolio j, the average beta 
EMBI
from a regression of EMBI returns on the total returns on the Merrill Lynh US BBB orporate bond index,
the average EMBI log total exess return, the average Standard and Poor's redit rating, and the average external debt to GNP ratio. Exess returns are annualized and reported in
perentage points. For exess returns, the table also reports Sharpe ratios, omputed as ratios of annualized means to annualized standard deviations. The portfolios are onstruted
by sorting EMBI ountries on two dimensions: every month ountries are sorted on their probability of default, measured by the S&P redit rating, and on 
EMBI
. Note that Standard
and Poor's uses letter grades to desribe a ountry's redit worthiness. We index Standard and Poor's letter grade lassiation with numbers going from 1 to 23. Data are monthly,
from JP Morgan and Standard and Poor's (Datastream). The sample period is 1/1995 - 8/2008.
3
0
Table 2: Prinipal Components
Portfolio 1 2 3 4 5 6
Portfolios Sorted on Credit Ratings and Betas Spreads
1 0:34 0:26 0:53  0:02 0:20 0:70
2 0:43 0:33 0:41 0:01  0:55  0:49
3 0:58 0:40  0:65 0:24 0:19 0:02
4 0:21  0:25  0:33  0:54  0:58 0:39
5 0:37  0:24 0:10  0:63 0:53  0:35
6 0:43  0:74 0:10 0:51  0:04 0:02
% Var. 72:19 10:40 6:72 6:35 2:35 1:99
Notes: This table reports the prinipal omponents oeÆients of the EMBI portfolios onstruted using the Standard and Poor's redit
ratings and the bond betas. Eah olumn orrespond to a dierent prinipal omponent, while eah row orresponds to a dierent portfolio.
The last row reports (in %) the share of the total variane explained by eah ommon fator. Data are monthly, from JP Morgan and
available on Datastream. The sample period is 1/1995-8/2008.
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Table 3: Asset Priing: Portfolios Sorted on Credit Ratings and Bond Betas
Panel I: Fator Pries and Loadings

R
EMBI

LS
EMBI
b
R
EMBI
b
LS
EMBI
R
2
RMSE 
2
GMM
1
7:80 9:80 0:54 0:52 83:27 1:14
[3:52℄ [3:44℄ [0:30℄ [0:22℄ 83:14
GMM
2
9:76 9:31 0:71 0:46 29:47 2:34
[2:73℄ [3:18℄ [0:23℄ [0:20℄ 93:33
FMB 7:80 9:80 0:53 0:52 78:03 1:14
[2:72℄ [3:25℄ [0:23℄ [0:21℄ 74:50
(2:72) (3:26) (0:23) (0:21) 77:53
Mean 7.94 9.1
Std [0:77℄ [0:88℄
Panel II: Fator Betas
Portfolio 
j
0
(%) 
j
R
EMBI

j
LS
EMBI
R
2
(%) 
2
() p   value
1 0:66 0:95  0:38 86:84
[1:36℄ [0:06℄ [0:05℄
2  0:33 1:14  0:25 83:83
[1:43℄ [0:05℄ [0:04℄
3  2:22 1:44  0:11 78:86
[2:79℄ [0:12℄ [0:05℄
4  0:29 0:54 0:10 49:81
[1:90℄ [0:07℄ [0:07℄
5 1:51 0:97 0:01 75:27
[1:75℄ [0:07℄ [0:06℄
6 0:66 0:95 0:62 92:20
[1:36℄ [0:06℄ [0:05℄
All 1:10 0:98
Notes: Panel I reports results from GMM and Fama-MBeth asset priing proedures. Market pries of risk , the adjusted R
2
, the
square-root of mean-squared errors RMSE and the p-values of 
2
tests on priing errors are reported in perentage points. b denotes
the vetor of fator loadings. All exess EMBI returns are multiplied by 12 (annualized). The standard errors in brakets are Newey and
West (1987) standard errors with the optimal number of lags aording to Andrews (1991). Shanken (1992)-orreted standard errors are
reported in parentheses. We do not inlude a onstant in the seond step of the FMB proedure. Panel II reports OLS estimates of the
fator betas. R
2
s and p-values are reported in perentage points. The 
2
test statisti 
0
V
 1

 tests the null that all interepts are jointly
zero. This statisti is onstruted from the Newey-West variane-ovariane matrix (1 lag) for the system of equations (see Cohrane
(2001), page 234). Data are monthly, from JP Morgan in Datastream. The sample period is 1/1995-08/2008. The alphas are annualized
and in perentage points.
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Table 4: Parameters Choies
Parameter Variable Value
Mean lenders' onsumption growth (%) 
L
1:89
Standard deviation of lenders' onsumption growth (%) 

L
1:50
Persistene oeÆient of the lenders' surplus onsumption ratio  :87
Persistene oeÆient of borrowers' endowments  :78
Standard deviation of borrowers' endowments (%) 

B 5:4
Diret default ost (%)  2:5
Re-entering probability (%)  12:5
Risk-aversion parameter  2
Lenders' time disount 
L
:89
Borrowers' time disount 
B
:83
The table reports benhmark values for the parameters used in the simulation. These parameters imply an annualized risk-free rate r
f
in
the large developed ountry equal to :94 perent per annum, a steady-state endowment ratio S
L
equal to :057 and a maximum surplus
endowment ratio S
L
max
of :094. The values for the diret output ost and the probability of re-entering nanial markets after a default are
per quarter. All the other parameters are annualized, e.g. they are reported as 4
L
, 2

L
, 2

B
,
4
, 
4
, 
L
4
, 
B
4
and 4r
f
sine the model is
simulated at quarterly frequeny. Values desribing lenders' onsumption growth are from Campbell and Cohrane (1999) and orrespond
to post-war US onsumption data, values desribing the borrowers' endowments are from Arellano (2008).
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Table 5: Portfolios of Simulated Data
Portfolios 1 2 3 4 5 6

j
SIM
Low High
E[dp
j
℄ Low Medium High Low Medium High
Consumption beta: 
j
SIM
Mean  0:58  0:70  0:72 1:26 1:20 1:05
Std 0:60 0:39 0:58 0:54 0:41 0:52
Default probability: E[dp
j
℄
Mean 3:58 4:49 5:42 2:49 3:51 4:97
Std 1:36 1:43 1:44 1:20 1:36 1:36
Exess Return: r
e;j
Mean 2:80 3:34 4:12 3:01 4:06 5:45
Std 1:12 1:17 1:20 1:53 1:63 1:53
SR 2:49 2:86 3:43 1:96 2:49 3:56
Debt/GNP: d
j
Mean 8:47 8:88 9:44 7:60 8:14 8:95
Std 7:44 7:63 7:62 7:18 7:36 7:26
Notes: This table reports, for eah portfolio j, the slope oeÆient 
SIM
from a regression of borrowers' output growth on the investors' onsumption growth, the average exess
return, the average expeted probability of default and the debt to output ratio. Exess returns are annualized and reported in perentage points. For exess returns, the table also
reports Sharpe ratios, omputed as ratios of annualized means to annualized standard deviations. Data omes from simulating our model under the assumption of habit preferenes
for foreign lenders. The portfolios are onstruted by sorting data for dierent ountries obtained by simulating our model in two dimensions: every month, ountries are sorted on
expeted default probabilities and on 
SIM
. The sample has 600 quarters.
3
4
Table 6: Prinipal Components Simulated Data
Portfolio 1 2 3 4 5 6
Portfolios Sorted on Default Probability and 
SIM
1 0:31 0:38 0:12 0:72 0:19  0:42
2 0:32 0:51 0:12 0:03  0:00 0:79
3 0:31 0:53 0:02  0:65  0:09  0:44
4 0:47  0:37 0:52 0:04  0:61  0:04
5 0:53  0:40 0:09  0:20 0:71 0:04
6 0:45  0:13  0:83 0:10  0:28 0:03
% Var. 68:91 17:39 8:52 2:95 1:74 0:49
Notes: This table reports the prinipal omponents oeÆients of the portfolios of simulated data. Eah olumn orrespond to a dierent
prinipal omponent, while eah row orresponds to a dierent portfolio. The last row reports (in %) the share of the total variane explained
by eah ommon fator. The model is simulated at quarterly frequeny.
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Figure 1: EMBI Global Annual Spreads and Standard and Poor's Ratings
The gure plots, for eah ountry in the EMBI Global Index, the annual stripped spread against the Standard and Poor's redit rating at
the end of August 2008. Spreads are in basis points. Standard and Poor's redit ratings are indexed from 1 (AAA) to 23 (SD). A higher
number implies a lower redit worthiness. Data are from Datastream.
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Figure 2: Predited against Atual EMBI Returns
The gure plots realized average EMBI exess returns on the vertial axis against predited average exess returns on the horizontal axis.
We regress atual exess returns on a onstant and the risk fators R
EMBI
and LS
EMBI
to obtain slope oeÆient 
j
. Eah predited
exess return is obtained using the OLS estimate 
j
times the sample mean of the fators. All returns are annualized. Data is monthly.
The sample period is 01/1995-08/2008.
37
Appendix A Conditional Asset Priing
The LS
EMBI
risk fator represents the exess return of a zero-ost strategy that goes long on the
last portfolio, and short on the rst. The prie of the LS
EMBI
risk fator should inrease when the
global market prie of risk inreases. To test this impliation, we onsider the onditional Euler
equation of a US investor. Hansen and Rihard (1987) explain that a simple onditional fator
model an be turned into an unonditional fator model using all the variables z
t
in the information
set of the investor. The onditional Euler equation for portfolio j , E
t
[M
t+1
R
j
t+1
℄ = 1; is then
equivalent to the following unonditional ondition:
E
t
[M
t+1
z
t
R
j
t+1
℄ = 1
Following Cohrane (2001), we an interpret this ondition as an Euler equation applied to a
managed portfolio z
t
R
j
t+1
. This managed portfolio orresponds to an investment strartegy that
goes long portfolio j when z
t
is positive and short otherwise. We assume that one saling variable
z
t
summarizes all the information set of the investor. We sale both returns and risk fators by
z
t
. As a result, we obtain twelve test assets: the original six EMBI portfolios, and the same
portfolios multiplied by the saling variable. For the risk fators, we use the average EMBI market
exess return R
EMBI
and LS
EMBI
, and we add LS
EMBI;t+1
z
t
. Our onditioning variable z is the
CBOE volatility index VIX. Table ?? reports results. We nd that the implied market pries of risk
assoiated with the LS
EMBI
fator vary signiantly through time. They tend to inrease in bad
times, when the implied US stok market volatility is high.
Appendix B Computational Algorithm
We disretize the borrower's endowment in 12 equally spaed grid points between +/- 2

B and
then add four extra grid points at the two extremes of the interval (+/-.3, +/-.25) to apture
the possibility of large positive or negative endowment shoks. We disretize the investors' surplus
onsumption ratio in 14 grid points equally spaed between :0072 and S
max
, and add one extra
grid point (.003) to apture non linearity in the surplus onsumption ratio near 0. We build the
transition matrix as desribed in Tauhen and Hussey (1991). The quantity of debt is disretized
in 75 equally spaed grid points between 0 (no debt) and -0.6 and we hek in our simulations that
this onstraint never binds. We start with a guess for the bond prie funtion Q
0
(B
0
; y) = Q
r f
for eah B
0
and x , where Q
r f
is the prie of the risk free bond available to investors and is equal
to Q
r f
= E[M
0
℄ and x = [y
L
; s℄
0
is a vetor ontaining the exogenous state variables. Given
the bond prie funtion, we use value funtion iteration to obtain the optimal onsumption, asset
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holdings and default poliy funtions. Given the optimal default poliy funtion found in the previous
step, we update the bond prie funtion Q
1
(B
0
; x) aording to 3.4. If a onvergene riterion is
satised, we stop. If not, we use the updated prie funtion to ompute new values for the optimal
onsumption, asset holdings and default poliy funtions and repeat this routine up to the point that
maxfQ
i
(B
0
; x)   Q
i+1
(B
0
x)g < 10
 7
: In order to obtain business yle statistis, we simulate for
100 times 5000 quarters of data and ompute moments as averages of the last 3000 observations
for eah simulation.
Appendix C One Appliation: Argentina
To hek our model, we study the limit ase of two ountries. We estimate a low value for 
i
for Argentina equal to 0:05. Given the low orrelation between Argentina's endowment and U.S.
onsumption growth, results should not dier signiantly from those obtained by Arellano (2008).
We solve the model numerially, simulate 5,000 quarters and then ompute relevant moments using
the last 3,000 quarters. We repeat this proess 100 times and then reports means and standard
deviations in table 8 next to the results in Arellano (2008) and the atual data for Argentina.
The borrower defaults approximately 4 times every 100 years, the average spread over the risk
free rate and the ratio of debt to GDP are lower than in the data. The value for the spread is
omparable to that in Arellano (2008), the value for the debt to GDP ratio is signiantly larger.
She reports a measure of interest rate spread with respet to an exogenous risk free rate of 4
perent, while in our model the risk free rate is endogenous with a mean annualized value of about
1 perent. Consumption is more volatile than inome, a onsistent feature of the emerging market
business yle. When output is higher, the ost of debt is lower.
In this model, the trade balane nx is equal to the apital ows Q
t
B
t+1
t
 B
t
t 1
. As a result, the
trade balane dereases when output inreases: ountries borrow more when output is higher, again
a onsistent feature of emerging markets aording to Neumeyer and Perri (2005). This evidene
suggests the existene of redit rationing in emerging markets and supports the assumption of the
asymmetri output ost desribed in setion (3.2). Even though the model repliates the sign of the
negative orrelation between trade balane and output, it is not able to math its exat magnitude.
This is not surprising: the stohasti proess for the endowment is a simple AR(1) proess with no
stohasti trend. Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) argue very eetively that "the yle is the trend,"
meaning that a large part of the emerging market's business yle is explained by shoks to trend.
In their model, after a positive shok to trend, agent expet higher output from that period onward.
Therefore, agents borrow to smooth onsumption over time. The response to a positive shok
to output around a stable trend is very dierent: agents inrease savings to maintain a smooth
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onsumption path in the future. In Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) shoks to trend generate the
negative orrelation between output and the trade balane. In this model, the high persistene of
the endowment shok and the asymmetri default ost struture explain the negative orrelation
of output with respet to the interest rate spread and the trade balane. After a positive shok to
output, agents expets output to be relatively high for some time. Beause the default probability
and the interest rate spread are relatively lower when output is high, agents borrow more in good
times. The model also suessfully reprodues the positive relation between ost of debt and the
trade balane that is found in the data: when ountries borrow more, the spread is lower.
Appendix D Lenders: Risk Neutral and Power Utility Cases
Table 9 reports the properties of 9 portfolios onstruted using data from a model where foreign
investors' preferenes are as follows:
U
L
= E
t
1∑
t=0
(
L
)
t
U
L
t
= E
t
1∑
t=0
(
L
)
t
(C
L
t
)
 
1  
;
where C
L
t
is the exogenous endowment reeived by the investors every period. In this ase, the
vetor of exogenous state x ontains only one variable: y
L
. We simulate this model using the
parameters in table 4 to haraterize the endowment proess in the small open eonomies and in
the large developed eonomy. We hoose values for  = 20%,  = 3% and 
B
= 0:82 to math an
average default probability of 3 perent per annum. We hoose a value for 
L
= 0:99 to math a
risk-free rate of 4 perent per annum. This version of the model with foreign investors haraterized
by power utility funtion reprodues only qualitatively our empirial ndings. The spread along the
beta-dimension is positive but small.
Table 10 reports the properties of 9 portfolios formed on data obtained from the model's simula-
tion with risk neutral lenders as in Arellano (2008). All the other parameters used in the simulation
are those use in the model with power utility. When investors are risk neutral, ountries with higher
default probability oer higher returns as in the ase of risk averse investors. However, there is no
spread along the beta dimension.
Appendix E Data: EMBI Global Sample
Table 11 reports the EMBI stripped spreads for our sample. All spreads are annual. Table 12 reports
the ratio of debt to GDP for the ountries in our sample, using data from the Global Development
Finane.
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Table 7: Conditional Asset Priing: Portfolios Sorted on Credit Ratings and Bond Betas

R
EMBI

LS
EMBI

LS
EMBI
V IX
b
R
EMBI
b
LS
EMBI
b
LS
EMBI
V IX
R
2
RMSE 
2
GMM
1
9:71 14:30 20:91 0:31 1:05  0:40 79:68 1:68
[4:60℄ [4:88℄ [10:54℄ [0:27℄ [1:04℄ [0:66℄ 76:49
GMM
2
12:65 14:26 19:94 0:49 1:18  0:51 8:98 3:56
[2:59℄ [3:66℄ [5:84℄ [0:15℄ [0:47℄ [0:24℄ 91:73
FMB 9:71 14:30 20:91 0:31 1:05  0:40 77:39 1:68
[3:42℄ [4:46℄ [8:96℄ [0:20℄ [1:02℄ [0:61℄ 85:83
(3:42) (4:48) (9:10) (0:20) (1:06) (0:63) 89:06
Mean 9.9 14.3 21.1
Std [0:79℄ [1:10℄ [1:84℄
Notes: Panel I reports results from GMM and Fama-MBeth asset priing proedures. Market pries of risk , the adjusted R
2
, the square-root of mean-squared errors RMSE and
the p-values of 
2
tests on priing errors are reported in perentage points. All exess EMBI returns are multiplied by 12 (annualized). The standard errors in brakets are Newey and
West (1987) standard errors with the optimal number of lags aording to Andrews (1991). Shanken (1992)-orreted standard errors are reported in parentheses. In the top panel,
the risk fators are the average EMBI market exess return, the return from the strategy that goes long on the last portfolio and short on the rst (LS
EMBI
) and LS
EMBI
V IX whih
is LS
EMBI
multiplied by the lagged value of the VIX index saled by its standard deviation. b
R
EMBI
, b
LS
EMBI
and b
LS
EMBI
V IX
denote the vetor of fator loadings. We use 12 test
assets: the original 6 EMBI portfolio exess returns and 6 additional portfolios obtained by multiplying the original set by the onditioning variable VIX (see Cohrane (2001)). Data
are monthly, from JP Morgan in Datastream. The sample period is 01/1995-08/2008. We do not inlude a onstant in the seond step of the FMB proedure.
4
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Table 8: Simulation: Argentina
Variable Model Data Arellano (2008)
Panel I: First moments
debt/GDP(%) 9:15 30:00 5:50
spread(%) 3:67 10:20 3:58
default probability(%) 4:32 3:00 3:00
Panel II: Standard deviations
y
B
(%) 8:03 8:10 5:80

B
(%) 8:54 9:50 6:30
nx
B
(%) 2:09 5:80 1:50
r
B
(%) 1:43 11:70 6:30
Panel III: Correlations
(y
B
; 
B
) 0:97 0:95 0:97
(y
B
; r
B
)  0:16  0:70  0:29
(y
B
; nx)  0:15  0:85  0:25
(r
B
; nx) 0:27 0:95 0:43
The table reports simulation results. The model's parameters are summarized in Table 4. The rst olumn in eah of the three panels reports
the results from our simulation. We use our model to simulate 5000 quarters, use the last 3000 quarters to ompute moments and repeat
this algorithm 100 times. We report averages of the moments from the 100 Montearlo simulations. The seond olumn of eah panel
reports data for Argentina up to last default, in the last quarter of 2001. Output and onsumption are quarterly log real series, seasonally
adjusted and de-trended with a linear trend for the period 1980 to 2001. The trade balane is in perentage of output for the sample 1993
to 2001. The interest rate spread series is the EMBI spread starting in 1983. We thank Cristina Arellano for sharing this data. The third
olumn for eah panel ontain the results in table 4 of Arellano (2008). The rst panel reports the average debt/GDP, the average annual
bond spread and the average annual default probability. The seond panel ontains the standard deviation of the de-trended borrower's
output, onsumption, trade balane and interest rate spread at quarterly frequeny. The third panel ontain the orrelation oeÆients
between borrower's output and onsumption, output and interest rate spread, output and trade balane and interest rate spread and trade
balane (all the series are de-trended).
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Table 9: Portfolios of Simulated Data - Investors with Power Utility
Portfolio 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Default probability: Low Default probability: Medium Default probability: High
Consumption beta: 
Mean  1:31 0:22 1:80  1:66 0:10 1:76  1:77  0:30 1:37
Std 1:78 1:92 1:67 1:04 1:04 0:91 1:63 1:76 1:63
Probability of default: E[dp
j
℄
Mean 1:19 1:15 1:04 2:66 2:67 2:52 5:95 5:70 5:94
Std 0:74 0:75 0:71 1:17 1:14 1:16 1:59 1:49 1:43
Exess Return: rx
j
Mean 1:07 1:14 1:16 2:44 2:70 2:75 5:68 5:72 6:32
Std 0:70 0:76 0:76 1:15 1:18 1:25 1:57 1:52 1:51
SR 1:53 1:50 1:52 2:12 2:29 2:19 3:61 3:76 4:17
Debt/GDP: d
j
Mean 7:22 7:61 7:76 5:72 5:80 6:01 4:75 4:29 4:17
Std 5:36 5:10 5:09 5:00 4:49 4:01 4:04 3:55 2:77
Notes: This table reports, for eah portfolio j, the slope oeÆient  from a regression of borrowers' output growth on the investors' onsumption growth, the average exess return,
the average expeted probability of default and the debt to output ratio. Exess returns are annualized and reported in perentage points. For exess returns, the table also reports
Sharpe ratios, omputed as ratios of annualized means to annualized standard deviations. Data omes from simulating our model under the assumption of risk aversion for foreign
lenders. The portfolios are onstruted by sorting data for dierent ountries obtained by simulating our model in two dimensions: every month, ountries are sorted on their expeted
probability of default and on . The sample has 400 quarters.
4
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Table 10: Portfolios of Simulated Data - Risk Neutral Investors
Portfolio 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Default probability: Low Default probability: Medium Default probability: High
Consumption beta: 
Mean  1:76  0:36 1:19  1:79  0:10 1:61  1:55  0:15 1:46
Std 1:66 1:88 1:84 0:96 1:10 1:00 1:67 1:75 1:60
Probability of default: E[dp
j
℄
Mean 1:66 1:69 1:62 3:24 3:33 3:25 6:84 7:28 7:10
Std 1:08 1:09 1:04 1:53 1:56 1:51 1:78 1:78 1:70
Exess Return: rx
j
Mean 1:45 1:48 1:41 2:98 3:07 2:98 6:62 7:07 6:88
Std 1:05 1:06 1:00 1:53 1:55 1:51 1:83 1:83 1:75
SR 1:38 1:40 1:41 1:95 1:97 1:97 3:61 3:86 3:94
Debt/GDP: d
j
Mean 9:59 9:89 9:65 8:61 8:91 8:78 6:89 6:75 6:68
Std 7:47 7:58 7:33 6:87 6:75 6:51 4:91 4:69 4:16
Notes: This table reports, for eah portfolio j, the slope oeÆient  from a regression of borrowers' output growth on the investors' onsumption growth, the average exess return,
the average expeted probability of default and the debt to output ratio. Exess returns are annualized and reported in perentage points. For exess returns, the table also reports
Sharpe ratios, omputed as ratios of annualized means to annualized standard deviations. Data omes from simulating our model under the assumption of risk neutrality for foreign
lenders. The portfolios are onstruted by sorting data for dierent ountries obtained by simulating our model in two dimensions: every month, ountries are sorted on their expeted
probability of default and on . The sample has 1500 quarters.
4
5
Table 11: EMBI Global annual spread
The table presents J.P. Morgan EMBI Global stripped spread. All spreads are annual. AC is the oeÆient of serial orrelation with one
lag and N is the total number of observations for eah ountry in the sample. The stripped spread diers from the more standard 'blended'
spread beause the values of any ollateralized ows are stripped from the bond, when omputing the dierene between the bond yield
to maturity and the yield of a orresponding U.S. Treasury bond. The standard deviation is omputed using the monthly series of annual
spread. Data are monthly, Deember 1993 - August 2008 and available on Datastream. For Moroo and Nigeria the last observation is
November, 2006.
EMBI Global Spread % Mean Std Min Median Max AC N
Argentina 18:31 21:00 1:93 70:78 7:14 0:97 174
Belize 5:23 1:09 3:67 6:68 5:12 0:94 15
Brazil 7:14 4:05 1:42 24:12 6:89 0:92 170
Bulgaria 6:27 5:34 0:56 21:54 5:47 0:95 167
Chile 1:33 0:54 0:55 2:44 1:29 0:95 109
China 1:03 0:46 0:44 3:57 0:97 0:88 171
Colombia 4:34 2:15 1:17 10:66 4:25 0:94 136
Cote D'Ivoire 23:37 7:54 5:86 34:76 24:83 0:92 121
Dominian Republi 5:42 3:62 1:35 17:30 4:22 0:96 79
Euador 12:57 8:20 4:61 47:64 10:18 0:93 160
Egypt 1:81 1:34 0:25 5:43 1:27 0:95 83
El Salvador 2:55 0:71 1:20 4:11 2:52 0:94 74
Hungary 0:73 0:38 0:07 1:76 0:67 0:91 113
Indonesia 2:53 0:62 1:44 4:24 2:45 0:80 49
Iraq 5:41 0:70 4:23 6:92 5:37 0:82 26
Kazakhstan 3:46 1:01 1:84 4:85 3:79 0:77 12
Lebanon 4:12 2:14 1:29 10:52 3:65 0:97 122
Malaysia 1:83 1:50 0:40 10:55 1:40 0:93 140
Mexio 4:04 2:79 0:93 15:89 3:52 0:95 174
Moroo 3:83 2:43 0:54 16:06 3:92 0:84 107
Pakistan 4:53 3:90 1:42 17:83 2:83 0:91 70
Panama 3:44 1:17 1:17 6:79 3:56 0:92 143
Peru 4:29 2:05 1:00 9:41 4:24 0:94 135
Philippine 4:13 1:48 1:38 9:37 4:23 0:91 126
Poland 2:00 1:60 0:35 8:71 1:81 0:96 164
Russia 9:62 13:34 0:90 57:83 3:80 0:96 126
Serbia 2:36 0:59 1:52 3:89 2:23 0:88 35
South Afria 2:22 1:29 0:67 6:55 1:93 0:95 162
Thailand 1:58 1:27 0:41 9:51 1:30 0:80 106
Trinidad and Tobago 2:16 0:70 1:34 3:34 2:08 0:88 13
Tunisia 1:42 0:75 0:49 3:94 1:15 0:93 73
Turkey 4:63 2:48 1:39 10:73 3:85 0:93 144
Ukraine 6:12 6:05 1:34 22:39 3:21 0:95 97
Uruguay 5:07 3:54 1:41 16:43 3:62 0:94 85
Venezuela 8:61 4:95 1:67 25:26 8:32 0:92 174
Vietnam 1:70 0:59 0:95 3:60 1:55 0:98 31
All 4:98 3:15 1:42 14:87 4:13 0:92 107
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Table 12: External Debt EMBI Global ountries
The table presents data on the ratio between total external debt and gross national produt (GNP) for the sample of EMBI Global ountries.
Data is at annual frequeny from the World Bank Global Development Finane (GDF) database for the period 1993-2006. All moments are
omputed using monthly series obtained by linear interpolation of the annual series. Data for Kazakhstan and Trinidad and Tobago is not
available on the GDF database.
External Debt Mean Min Median Max
Argentina 0:65 0:28 0:52 1:56
Belize 0:71 0:35 0:71 1:18
Brazil 0:32 0:19 0:34 0:47
Bulgaria 0:86 0:57 0:86 1:16
Chile 0:46 0:32 0:43 0:64
China 0:15 0:12 0:14 0:20
Colombia 0:35 0:27 0:34 0:46
Cote D'Ivoire 1:35 0:76 1:24 2:31
Dominian Republi 0:35 0:24 0:31 0:55
Euador 0:74 0:42 0:72 1:11
Egypt 0:42 0:27 0:38 0:75
El Salvador 0:37 0:26 0:35 0:56
Hungary 0:66 0:56 0:64 1:03
Indonesia 0:75 0:38 0:63 1:68
Iraq            
Kazakhstan 0:49 0:00 0:37 1:03
Lebanon 0:60 0:17 0:48 1:08
Malaysia 0:47 0:36 0:44 0:62
Mexio 0:33 0:19 0:32 0:60
Moroo 0:57 0:29 0:59 0:86
Pakistan 0:45 0:28 0:47 0:54
Panama 0:73 0:62 0:69 1:00
Peru 0:53 0:33 0:54 0:71
Philippine 0:65 0:47 0:65 0:78
Poland 0:38 0:27 0:39 0:59
Russia 0:42 0:17 0:33 0:93
Serbia 0:76 0:44 0:69 1:28
South Afria 0:17 0:13 0:17 0:23
Thailand 0:54 0:27 0:48 0:97
Trinidad and Tobago            
Tunisia 0:65 0:57 0:64 0:77
Turkey 0:52 0:35 0:51 0:79
Ukraine 0:33 0:01 0:39 0:55
Uruguay 0:55 0:29 0:36 1:20
Venezuela 0:44 0:25 0:42 0:67
Vietnam 0:85 0:34 0:82 2:55
All 0:55 0:32 0:51 0:92
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Table 13: Portfolio Swithing
Portfolios 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 76.78 7:37 0:00 7:38 5:15 3:32
2 10:04 67.51 11:45 1:74 2:80 6:46
3 0:26 8:39 79.17 0:31 0:95 10:92
4 5:66 2:25 0:31 83.71 8:07 0:00
5 4:20 3:78 2:40 6:85 74.66 8:10
6 1:92 4:86 9:30 0:00 6:28 77.64
Average probability that a ountry is in portfolio j at time t + 1 onditional on being in portfolio i at time t, where i ; j are respetively the
rows and olumns of the table. Data are monthly.
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Figure 3: Portfolio Alloation for for Argentina and Mexio
This gure plots, for Argentina and Mexio the monthly S&P redit rating, the market beta 
EMBI
and the portfolio alloation. Data are
monthly. The sample is 01/1995 - 08/2008.
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